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OPPORTUNITY ANALYSIS OF NEWBORN SCREENING PROGRAMS 
 








There exist congenital diseases that reduce newborns' potential opportunities. This 
reduction is sometimes alleviated if the congenital disease is early detected thanks to a 
newborn screening program. We propose an outcome measurement of newborn screening 
programs based on the opportunity gains they offer after its implementation. We show that, 
under plausible assumptions, preferences among the available screening programs for a 
particular disease according to this new outcome measurement, do not depend on the metric 
of opportunity. We also apply our model to the current debate about choosing between a 
selective or a universal newborn hearing screening program to detect congenital hearing 
impairment.  
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The discipline of health economics is becoming enormously popular nowa-
days. The economic evaluation directs many types of health care decisions
like, for instance, the selection of a clinical strategy for a given condition out
of a set of alternatives. A related problem is the one we endorse here.
One of the most ﬂourishing areas within health economics is the one that
concerns the equity in the delivery of health care (e.g., Bleichrodt (1997),
van Doorslaer et al., (2000), Wagstaﬀ and van Doorslaer, (2001), Williams
and Cookson (2001), Roemer (2002), Bleichrodt et al. (2004)). The word
“equity” usually refers to the distributive justice in the allocation of a com-
modity (“health” in this case). The underlying motivation in most of the
above-mentioned literature is the so-called ‘just compensation principle’ by
which health inequalities that are not attributable to an individual’s respon-
sibility should be compensated by society. An obvious instance of health in-
equalities that are not attributable to an individual’s responsibility are those
inequalities due to congenital impairments. The ‘just compensation princi-
ple’ implies that society should do its best to alleviate the consequences of
congenital diseases in impaired infants.
There are some congenital diseases whose negative consequences could
be alleviated by means of an early detection and a subsequent treatment.
Typical examples of diseases obeying this axiom are, for instance, congenital
hearing impairment, hipotiroidism or phenylcetonuria. In these cases, the
implementation of an early detection protocol seems to be suﬃciently justiﬁed
on the sole basis of the ‘just compensation principle’. Indeed, early detection
protocols can be deemed as an eﬃcient tool to avoid non-feasible future
compensations to individuals suﬀering from congenital impairments.
If the decision about the implementation of an early detection protocol
appears to be unquestionable, the selection of a particular protocol among
the alternatives to be implemented is, by no means, a straightforward deci-
sion. Usually, this decision is conducted by an economic evaluation of the
existing alternatives. The economic evaluation of health care programs in-
volves both technical and value judgements. This, and the special nature
of the commodity being considered (health), is the germ of the complexity
3of this problem whose multiple angles leave room for new techniques to be
developed with which we can face the problem. In this paper we present one
of such new techniques to address the evaluation of early detection protocols,
also known as screening programs.
Screening is traditionally deﬁned as testing a population of asymptomatic
individuals to identify precursors of a disease. The subjects who test positive
are sent on for further evaluation in a subsequent diagnostic evaluation to
determine whether they do, in fact, have the disease. An implicit assumption
underlying the clinical interest of screening programs is that early detection,
before the development of symptoms, will lead to a more favorable prognosis.
This is so because, by means of a screening, it is possible to treat the disease
before it becomes clinically manifest, which is more eﬀective than a later
treatment. Usually, there are diﬀerent screening strategies for a given disease.
As mentioned above, we assume that the decision about implementing one
of them is taken up exogenously and the issue is to select the best strategy
to carry out, among the available ones.
The ﬁrst problem that one has to face in order to run an economic eval-
uation of screening programs is the outcome measurement of the available
strategies. This is a major issue in the discipline of health economics, since
no measure has presented itself free of shortcomings and clearly superior to
the other existing ones. In a companion paper, Herrero & Moreno-Ternero
(2003), we analyze the problem of selecting among screening programs, mak-
ing use of the QALY measurement. The QALY is possibly the most fre-
quently employed measure in health economics (e.g., Gold et al. (1996),
Drummond et al. (1997), Dolan (2001)). It is a quite tractable measure
and therefore easy to use. Nevertheless, it is both practically and conceptu-
ally dubious. Among other things, it relies on very restrictive assumptions
on individual preferences. It has also been argued by many authors (e.g.,
Wagstaﬀ (1991), Dolan (1998), Østerdal (2003), Bleichrodt et al. (2004))
that this index may fail to capture distributive justice.
Here we propose evaluating newborn screening programs for a given con-
genital disease by means of an opportunity analysis. By opportunity analysis
we mean computing the opportunities a newborn screening program oﬀers
to a randomly given individual and selecting the best option accordingly.
4T of o r m a l i z eo u rm o d e lw em a k eu s eo fam e t r i co fo p p o r t u n i t y . 1 In other
words, we associate with each individual a unique number on a zero-one
scale, interpreting that number as the degree of the potential opportunities
the individual enjoys. This numerical measurement renders the subsequent
analysis very tractable analytically. For a given cohort of newborns suscep-
tible of suﬀering a disease, we distinguish four reference groups.
1. True positives: Those impaired infants that are detected thanks to a
newborn screening program.
2. False positives: Those healthy infants that are (erroneously) identiﬁed
as impaired infants, with a newborn screening program.
3. True negatives: Those healthy infants with a negative result in a new-
born screening program.
4. False negatives: Those impaired infants that are not detected thanks
to a screening program.
If we assume that individual opportunities do not vary within these four
subgroups, but they might diﬀer between them, we can consider as the oppor-
tunities a newborn screening program oﬀers, the aggregation of the opportu-
nities of an individual in each of these groups, weighted by the probability of
being in each group. The reason why each screening program is associated
with a diﬀerent magnitude of overall potential opportunities in the popula-
tion is that the previous probabilities depend on the intrinsic properties of
the screening program being considered. If we adopt as the ‘status quo’ the
absence of screening, we may identify as the outcome of a screening program
the potential opportunity gains that oﬀers, with respect to the status quo.
We formalize this model in the paper and show that the opportunity
analysis just described can be considerably simpliﬁed under some mild as-
sumptions: opportunities of true positives are strictly larger than those of
false negatives (with a constant diﬀerence across screening programs) and op-
portunities of true negatives and of false positives are identical. Under such
1For reviews of the literature concerning metric of opportunity see, for instance, Per-
agine (1998) or Sugden (1998).
5plausible assumptions, the outcome of a program can be seen as its level of
sensitivity, i.e., the probability of ﬁnding by the screening procedure a dis-
ability when it is actually there. In particular, it is interesting to note that
the conclusions a opportunity analysis oﬀers do not depend on the metric of
opportunity that we choose.
One might argue that the model just described is too simplistic as other
circumstances (e.g., gender, race, parental socioeconomic status, etc.) that
may inﬂuence future opportunities of newborns are not considered. The next
step of the paper is that of enriching the model described above by intro-
ducing individual circumstances. We develop this more complex model and
remark that the previous preliminary model, simple that it is, provides us
with very useful insights to solve this more general one. Indeed, we show
that an additional assumption to the ones mentioned above; namely, the
probability of being a true positive does not depend on the remaining indi-
vidual circumstances, suﬃces to obtain the same conclusion: the opportunity
analysis is robust to changes of the metric of opportunity.
We conclude the paper applying our model to the current debate on the
implementation of newborn hearing screening programs in some states of
the United States and in some European countries (e.g., National Institutes
of Health Consensus Development Conference Statement, 1993; European
Consensus Project on Neonatal Hearing Screening, 1999; Joint Committee
on Infant Hearing, 2000; Keren et al., 2002). We show that, according to an
opportunity analysis, universal programs are preferred to selective programs,
in which only newborns with risk factor are screened. This conclusion agrees
with the more recent pediatric recommendations that have been published
(e.g., Joint Committee on Infant Hearing, 2000).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic
model of the opportunity analysis. The results for this model are presented
in Section 3. In Section 4 we study the extended model. An application
to the case of congenital hearing impairment is taken up in Section 5, and
Section 6 concludes.
62T h e m o d e l
We consider a particular congenital impairment for which there exist newborn
screening programs that permit its early detection. We assume that the
early detection of the disease, followed by an adequate treatment, might
reduce considerably its negative consequences. Let N = {1,...,n} be the
corresponding cohort of newborns susceptible of suﬀering the disease. The
status of a newborn with respect to the disease is either d =0(if the infant
is healthy) or d =1(if the infant is impaired). We denote by ρ ∈ [0,1]
the prevalence of the disease in the cohort, i.e., the fraction of impaired
newborns in the cohort.2 We denote by G0 the set of newborns with negative
disease status and by G1 the set of newborns with positive disease status.
By construction, N = G0 ∪ G1 and the number of newborns in each of the
subgroups is |G0| =( 1− ρ) · n and |G1| = ρ · n, respectively.
Newborns can be partitioned into four groups, according to whether they
do or do not have the disease and whether their screening tests are positive or
negative. Thus, there are four groups of newborns: true positives,n e w b o r n s
whom the screening correctly indicates to have the disease; false positives,
those who do not have the disease but who have a positive screening test;
false negatives, those who have the disease but are mistakenly cleared by the
screening; and true negatives, those who do not have the disease and are
correctly identiﬁed as such by the screening.3 We can compute how likely an
individual would belong to each of the four groups by using characteristics
of the population (prevalence) and of the detection ability of the screening
test (sensitivity and speciﬁcity). The sensitivity of the screening test (π1)i s
the conditional probability that an individual with the disease is positively
detected by the test. This is estimated by the ratio of true positives to total
impaired individuals ( α
α+γ). The speciﬁcity of the test (π2) is the conditional
probability of an individual without the disease being correctly detected as
negative in the test. This is measured by the ratio of true negatives to
the number of disease-free individuals ( δ
β+δ). Using these deﬁnitions, the
2If i denotes the number of impaired newborns in N then ρ = i
n. We interpret this
number as the probability of a newborn in the cohort being impaired.
3If there is no screening program being implemented then the group of false negatives
is G1, whilst G0 is the group of true negatives.
7probability of an individual being a true negative is the probability that she
does not have the disease (1 − ρ) times the probability that the screening
correctly indicates that she does not have the disease (π2). The probabilities
of the individual to be a true positive (ρπ1), a false positive ((1−ρ)(1−π2))
and a false negative (ρ(1 − π1)) can be similarly expressed. The advantage
of this way of writing the screening probabilities is that it makes easier to
assess the implications of variations in the parameters ρ, π1 or π2 separately.
Table 1
Impairment status and test results
Status: Number of Cases
Test Positive Negative Total
Positive αβ α + β
Negative γδ γ + δ





Sensitivity π1 = α
α+γ
Speciﬁcity π2 = d
β+δ
Let S = {s1,...,sm} denote the set of available screening programs for the
early detection of the disease. Let s0 denote the ‘status quo’, i.e., the sce-
nario without any screening program. For all j =0 ,1,...,m, each screening








2 denote the sen-
sitivity and the speciﬁcity of sj respectively, and cj denotes the incremental
costs of the screening program with respect to the status quo.4 By costs of a
screening program, we mean the costs incurred by the test, i.e., technology
and wages of the specialists who supervise it, and the costs of the ﬁnal diag-
nostic evaluation to which every positive infant is referred after the screening
test. It is worth noting that we assume all impaired individuals receive di-
agnostic evaluation, regardless of whether their impairment is detected early
4>From here onwards, unless otherwise stated, it is assumed that all costs are per
capita.
8or not. Consequently, the incremental health-care cost of implementing a




s + r · (1 − ρ) · (1 − π
j
2) · cd,( 1 )
where cj
s is the cost of the screening itself, r is the return rate and cd the cost
of the diagnostic evaluation.5
For ease in exposition, denote an infant’s test result in the screening
program sj as tj =0if it is negative, and as tj =1if it is positive. Then, for
each sj ∈ S, d ∈ {0,1} and tj ∈ {0,1} denote by G
j
(d,t) the group of infants
sharing disease status d and test result tj, after implementing sj.T h u s ,N










According to the notation introduced above, it is straightforward to see that
the probabilities of being in each of the groups are given by:
ρ
j















(0,0) =( 1 − ρ) · π
j
2
Now, we compute the potential opportunities of each newborn. To do so, we
need an metric of opportunity. A metric of opportunity is a mapping associ-
ating with each individual a unique number on a zero-one scale representing
the degree of potential opportunities, and interpreting 0 (1) as the lowest
(highest) possible degree of potential opportunities an individual might face.
Formally, a metric of opportunity is a function
Ω : {0,1}×{ 0,1}×S∪ {s
0}  → [0,1],
where Ω(d,t,sj) ∈ [0,1] denotes the degree of potential opportunities of an
individual with disease status d and a test result tj after implementing sj.
5By return rate we mean the percentage of infants returned for follow-up testing.
9We deﬁne the degree of opportunity associated with each screening pro-











(d,t) is the probability of being in G
j
(d,t). In other words, Ωj is the sum
of the degrees of potential opportunities associated with each group (true
positives, false positives, false positives and true negatives) multiplied by the
probability of an individual being in the group. In this respect, Ωj can be
interpreted as the expected opportunities of an infant after implementing sj.
In particular, the degree of opportunity associated with the ‘status quo’
comes determined by
Ω
0 = ρ · Ω(1,0,s
0)+( 1− ρ) · Ω(0,0,s
0).( 4 )
Consequently, the degree of opportunity gained, associated with a screening
sj ∈ S,i sO
j
Ω = Ωj − Ω0.
The model just described provides us with a simple framework to choose
among the available screening programs by means of an opportunity anal-
ysis. As a ﬁrst stage, the available programs are ranked according to the
opportunities they oﬀer. As a second stage, for a ﬁxed stock of resources,
the health authority should choose the program that provides the highest
degree of opportunity gained within the set of feasible options, i.e., within
those whose cost is below the available budget. If ﬁnancing is not an issue we





In this section we provide additional assumptions under which the opportu-
nity analysis described in Section 2 is independent of the metric of opportu-
nity.
The ﬁrst assumption says, roughly, that opportunities do not decrease ‘per
se’ by being referred to a screening program. In other words, the degree of
10potential opportunities of a true (false) negative individual after implement-
ing a screening program coincides with the degree of potential opportunities
of a healthy (impaired) individual in the status quo. Formally:







The second assumption says that there are no diﬀerences in potential
opportunities between healthy individuals with diﬀerent test results, i.e.,
between a false positive and a true negative individual. Formally:





The third assumption says that early detection of the disease is advan-
tageous at an individual level, and that this individual improvement is inde-
pendent of the screening method chosen. That is, the degree of opportunity
gained by an impaired infant after being detected by a screening program is
strictly positive and constant (although depending on the metric of oppor-
tunity) for each program. Formally:





We have the following result.
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the degree of opportunity gained
that a screening program oﬀers is its sensitivity, up to a (multiplicative)
constant factor.
Proof. Let Ω be a metric of opportunity. By (4), the degree of opportunity
associated with the ‘status quo’, according to Ω,i s
Ω
0 = ρ · Ω(1,0,s
0)+( 1− ρ) · Ω(0,0,s
0).
11Similarly, by (3), given a screening procedure sj ∈ S, its degree of opportu-







































































By Assumption 3, λ(Ω)=Ω(1,1,s j) − Ω(1,0,s 0) > 0,f o ra l lsj ∈ S. Then,
O
j




k = k(ρ,Ω)=ρ · λ(Ω) > 0.
Note that k d e p e n d so nt h ep r e v a l e n c eo ft h ei m p a i r m e n ta n dt h em e t r i co f
opportunity. It is not, however, screening method-speciﬁc.
The main relevance of Theorem 1 lies on the fact that, under Assumptions
1 to 3, the decision about the programs, according to the opportunity analysis
we described in Section 2, does not depend on the metric of opportunity that
we decide to ﬁx.
12It can be inferred from the proof of the theorem that both the degrees of
opportunity gained and the sensitivity levels of the programs yield the same
ranking of preferences among the set of alternative programs. The cardinal
information of these preferences is captured by the constant k that appears
in the proof, which depends on the prevalence of the impairment and the
metric of opportunity.
To conclude, we acknowledge that, since the prevalence of the disease
appears in the constant factor k, our result is only informative when the
analysis refers to screening programs for the same disease. It cannot be
used, however, to compare screening programs of diﬀerent diseases.
4 Including circumstances
One might argue that the model described above is very simple. In partic-
ular, it only computes the inﬂuence of suﬀering a congenital disease on the
potential opportunities of a newborn and rules out any other. Suﬀering a
congenital disease is deﬁnitely a circumstance, i.e., a factor beyond the con-
trol of an individual, that aﬀects the potential opportunities of an individual.
Surely, there are many others that also aﬀect, positively or negatively. In-
stances are the gender, the race, the parental socioeconomic status, the level
of formal education attained by their parents, and so on. The next step of
the paper is enriching the model described above by introducing individual
circumstances.
Assume each infant in the cohort N is identiﬁed by a proﬁle of individual
circumstances, the disease status being one of them. We denote by C the set
of possible sub-proﬁles of circumstances, that do not comprise the disease
status d.F o re a c hp r o ﬁle of circumstances (c,d) ∈ C×{ 0,1},w ed e n o t eb y







where G(c,d) ∩ G(c,d) = ∅, for all (c,d)  =( c ,d  ) in C×{ 0,1}.F o r e a c h
(c,d) ∈ C×{0,1},w ed e n o t eb yρ(c,d) the probability of being in G(c,d).6 Then,
6More precisely, p(c,d) =
|G(c,d)|
q ,w h e r e|G(c,d)| denotes the cardinality of G(c,d).
13ρ =
S
c∈C ρ(c,1). Finally, for the sake of completeness, let ρc = ρ(c,0) + ρ(c,1)
be the probability of sharing the sub-proﬁle of circumstances c.
After the implementation of a screening program, there is a subsequent
and new population partition, depending on the test results and the circum-
stances. If, for each sj ∈ S, c ∈ C, d ∈ {0,1} and tj ∈ {0,1} we denote by
G
j
(c,d,t) the group of infants sharing circumstances c, disease status d and test











Recall from Section 2 that ρ
j
(d,t) denotes the probability of being in G
j
(d,t),
i.e., with disease status d and test result tj after implementing sj.I fρ
j
(c,d,t)









In this new framework, a metric of opportunity is a mapping associating
with each proﬁle of circumstances and test result a unique number on a zero-
one scale representing the degree of potential opportunities, and interpreting
0 (1) as the lowest (highest) possible degree of potential opportunities an
individual might face. Formally, a function
Ω : C×{ 0,1}×{ 0,1}×S∪ {s
0}  → [0,1],
where Ω(c,d,t,sj) ∈ [0,1] denotes the degree of potential opportunities of
an individual with proﬁle of circumstances (c,d) and a test result tj after
implementing sj.
The degree of opportunity gained, associated with a screening sj ∈ S,
is deﬁned in an analogous manner to that of Section 3, i.e., O
j












for each sj ∈ S ∪ {s0}.
W en o wm i m i ct h ea s s u m p t i o n so fS e c t i o n3i n t ot h i sf r a m e w o r k .
Assumption 1: For each metric of opportunity Ω, for all sj ∈ S, and for






14Assumption 2: For each metric of opportunity Ω, for all sj ∈ S, and for




Assumption 3: For each metric of opportunity Ω, for all sj ∈ S, and for




The plausibility of these three assumptions seems to be unobjectionable.
We include now a fourth assumption whose plausibility depends on the
particular framework that we consider. It says that the probability of being a
true positive does not depend on the individual sub-proﬁle of circumstances.
In other words, two newborns with diﬀerent sub-proﬁle of circumstances
c1,c 2 ∈ C have the same probability of being true positives. In order to
f o r m a l i z et h i sa s s u m p t i o n ,w ei n t r o d u c eap i e c eo fn o t a t i o n . F o rx ∈ N
denote by c(x) her sub-proﬁle of circumstances. Then, the assumption is the
following:
Assumption 4: For all x ∈ N, sj ∈ S, and c ∈ C we have
Pr(x ∈ G
j
(1,1) | c(x)=c)=P r ( x ∈ G
j
(1,1)).
Note that this assumption is less strong than what one might initially
think. Assumption 4 is not saying that the impairment status of an infant
and the remaining circumstances are uncorrelated. It is saying however,
that being identiﬁed as a true positive will not depend on the remaining
circumstances.
We obtain the following result.
Theorem 2 Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4, the degree of opportunity
gained that a screening program oﬀers is its sensitivity, up to a (multiplica-
tive) constant factor.
15Proof. Let Ω be a metric of opportunity. By (6), the degree of opportunity











Similarly, given a screening procedure sj ∈ S, its degree of opportunity



























j) − ρ(c,d) · Ω(c,d,0,s
0))






















































where λ(Ω,c)=Ω(c,1,1,s j) − Ω(c,1,0,s 0) > 0. Now, by the deﬁnition of
conditional probability, ρ
j
(c,1,1) = ρc·Pr(x ∈ G
j
(1,1) | c(x)=c). By Assumption
4, Pr(x ∈ G
j
(1,1)|c(x)=c)=P r ( x ∈ G
j







1, it follows that
O
j




k = k(C,ρ,ρc,Ω)=ρ ·
[
c∈C
ρc · λ(Ω,c) > 0.
Note that k depends on the set of circumstances (C), the prevalence of the
impairment (ρ), the probabilities of each proﬁle of circumstances (ρc) and
the metric of opportunity (Ω). It is not screening method-speciﬁc, however.
Theorem 2 mimics Theorem 1 in a more general framework where in-
dividual circumstances are also considered to compute individual potential
opportunities. The conclusion both theorems oﬀer is the same, namely, the
opportunity analysis of newborn screening programs does not depend on the
metric of opportunity that we decide to ﬁx. More precisely, they show that
both the degrees of opportunity gained and the sensitivity levels of the pro-
grams yield the same ranking of preferences among the set of alternative
p r o g r a m s . T h eo n l yp r i c ew eh a v et op a yt oo b t a i nt h es a m er e s u l ti nt h e
more general model is that of accepting Assumption 4. As mentioned above,
the plausibility of this assumption depends on the particular framework that
we consider.
5 Application: the case of congenital hearing
impairment
We conclude by applying our model to the case of congenital hearing im-
pairment. This is a disease that satisﬁes all the medical requirements to
impose a prevention program, based on a newborn screening protocol. First
of all, it is a serious disease, for which a lack of early diagnosis will cause
problems in language acquisition. Signiﬁcant hearing loss interferes with the
development of speech perception abilities needed for later language learning
(Yoshinaga-Itano et al., 1999). These impairments in communication skills
can lead to learning disabilities and ultimately, to limitations in career op-
portunities. Moreover, it is more frequent than other impairments for which
newborn screening programs are in use in developed countries (White and
17Maxon, 1995). Finally, there are reliable screening methods, with high levels
of sensitivity and speciﬁcity, and there is also an eﬀective treatment available.
Due to these facts, there is a broad agreement to impose a newborn
hearing screening program, as subsequently recommended the National In-
stitutes of Health Consensus Statement on the Early Identiﬁcation of Hearing
Impairment in Infants and Young Children, 1993; the European Consensus
Statement on Neonatal Hearing Screening, 1999; and the Statement of the
J o i n tC o m m i t t e eo nI n f a n tH e a r i n g ,2 0 0 0 .
Having reached this consensus, the debate moved to select between a uni-
versal and a selective alternative. In a Universal Newborn Hearing Screening
(“UNHS” hereafter) every newborn is tested, whereas in a Selective Newborn
Hearing Screening (“SNHS” hereafter) only those who were born with a risk
factor, such as being in the neonatal intensive care unit or having a family
history of hearing impairment, are tested. A UNHS is more expensive but
also more eﬀective, since only 50% of newborns with a hearing impairment
belong to a group at risk (National Institutes of Health Consensus Develop-
ment Conference Statement, 1993). It is currently mandated in 32 states of
the United States (Keren et al., 2002). The SNHS, however, was and contin-
ues to be practiced throughout the United States and the rest of the world
(Keren et al., 2002).
There is ample literature on choosing between UNHS and SNHS, espe-
cially from the medical viewpoint (e.g., National Institutes of Health Con-
sensus Development Conference Statement, 1993; Bess and Paradise, 1994;
Downs and Yoshinaga-Itano, 1999; European Consensus Project on Neonatal
Hearing Screening, 1999; Joint Committee on Infant Hearing, 2000, Thomp-
son et al., 2001), but also from an economic viewpoint (e.g., Kemper and
Downs, 2000; Kezirian et al., 2001; Keren et al., 2002; Herrero and Moreno-
Ternero, 2004). The aim of this section is to apply our model to provide an
additional viewpoint to this current debate about choosing between the two
alternatives.
185.1 Protocols
According to the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Infant Hearing,
every neonate should be tested by Otoacoustic Emissions (“OAE” hereafter),
a less eﬃcient and expensive test, followed by Auditory Brainstem Responses
(“ABR” hereafter), a more eﬃcient and expensive test, for those who failed
the initial stage (Joint Committee on Infant Hearing, 2000). We evaluate
two slightly diﬀerent versions of this universal 2-stage screening, by changing
some aspects of the OAE and ABR strategies. On the one hand, we con-
sider automated transient-evoked otoacoustic emissions (TEOAE) as a ﬁrst
stage, followed, when indicated, by automated auditory brainstem response
(AABR) testing. We refer to this protocol as U1. On the other hand, we con-
sider otoacoustic emissions (OAE) as a ﬁrst stage, followed, when indicated,
by a shorter screening version of automated auditory brain response testing
(S-ABR). We refer to this protocol as U2. 7 Finally, there is a diﬀerent
UNHS currently in practice in a Spanish region (Navarra). In this case, the
protocol has three stages. The ﬁrst stage consists on an OAE test to every
newborn at the third day of life, before leaving the nursery. For those who
failed it, there will be a second OAE at the ﬁfteenth day of life. Finally, the
third stage involves a new OAE test for those neonates who failed the second
stage and return at the third month. We will refer to this protocol as U3.
A selective screening includes a previous stage with a high-risk criterion
(HRC), and then applies the protocol for infants at risk for congenital hear-
ing loss. We therefore have three alternative selective screening procedures,
which will be called S1, S2 and S3. Each protocol (selective or universal)
concludes with a diagnostic evaluation for those who failed after the last
stage.
To summarize, we focus our attention on six alternative early detection
programs. Formally, following the notation of Section 2, let s0 denote the
absence of a screening procedure, s1 (s2)[ s3]t h eﬁrst (second) [third] UNHS
procedure, and s4 (s5)[ s6]t h eﬁrst (second) [third] SNHS, based on high risk
7The reader is referred to Kemper & Downs (2000) and Kezirian et al. (2001) for
further details about protocols U1 and U2.
19factors.
Table 2
Data of the screening procedures
Screening
Parameters s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
Sensitivity (π
j
1) 0 .784 .902 .840 .463 .532 .496
Speciﬁcity (π
j
2) 1 .996 .950 .995 .999 .998 .999
Direct cost (cj) 01 0 .05 13.91 11.68 1.59 1.65 1.57
Prevalence (ρ) .0011
Table 2 shows the mean estimates of the general and speciﬁcd a t af r o m
each procedure. Additional information about such data, like their conﬁdence
intervals, can be obtained in Kemper & Downs (2000), Kezirian et al. (2001)
and Keren et al. (2002).
5.2 Opportunity Analysis
Now, we provide an additional viewpoint to this debate by means of an
opportunity analysis. Apart from the congenital hearing impairment status,
we consider the gender as an additional circumstance. There is no reported
evidence against Assumption 4 of Section 4 in this case. The remaining
assumptions of Section 4 are also sound in the framework of newborn hearing
screening. Hence, the opportunity analysis can be reduced to the study of the
sensitivity of each program. As a result, preferences among the alternatives,
would be the following:
s2  s3  s1  s5  s6  s4.
Note that this is precisely the ranking that one obtains considering the whole
stream of costs associated with these programs.8 In particular, this ranking
says that universal programs are preferred to selective programs, as recom-
mended by the NIH and the JCIH consensus statement.
8Although the ranking according to their direct costs is diﬀerent, this is precisely what
we obtain when computing indirect costs like special education or disability allowances
(e.g., Herrero and Moreno-Ternero (2004)).
20For the sake of completeness, and to get additional information about
the cardinality of the preferences over the set of alternatives, we provide an
opportunity analysis for a given metric of opportunity. We might think of
several metrics to deal with this task. Here, we consider the notion of degree
of potential success, introduced by Mariotti (2002), that particularly ﬁts to
this example.
The basic idea provided by Mariotti is the deﬁnition of success by means
of diﬀerent variables, reaching some minimal values. Success could be, for
instance, the attainment of a minimum level of income, or a certain level
education, or even a certain life expectancy above some level of good health.
The deﬁnition of success might depend, not only on the congenital impair-
ment status, but also on other circumstances, like the gender in our case.
Assume that a particular deﬁnition of success has been agreed upon. The
metric of opportunity Ω is to be interpreted as the probability of reaching
success.
More precisely, we assume that a healthy male will certainly reach success,






for all sj ∈ S. We assume, however, that for females this probability is only





for all sj ∈ S and where f means ‘female’. Obviously, for impaired in-
fants, probabilities are lower. Nevertheless, for those who were detected by
a screening, the probabilities are slightly higher. Formally:
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To conclude, assume that 60% of the newborns are females, i.e., ρm =0 .4
and ρf =0 .6.
Under this data, it is straightforward to compute that the degree of op-








1 =0 .0005 · π
j
1,
where ρ is the prevalence of congenital hearing loss. Table 3 shows the degree
of opportunity gained each program oﬀers.
Table 3
Degree of opportunity gained
Screening
Opportunity s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6
(O
j
Ω) 0.00039 0.00045 0.00042 0.00023 0.00027 0.00024
6 Discussion
In this paper, we have presented a new technique to select the best newborn
screening program for a particular congenital impairment out of alterna-
tive options. Such a technique consists on evaluating screening programs by
means of the potential opportunities they produce. If ﬁnancing is not an
issue, we would advocate for implementing the program that provides the
highest potential opportunities.
Now, in health care, as in other areas of social policy, decisions have to
be made concerning the allocation of scarce resources. Usually, the program
which shows the highest beneﬁts is one of the most expensive programs. For
a ﬁxed budget, the program that should be implemented is the one providing
higher potential opportunities whose cost is below the budget. In general,
the health authority has a public budget to be distributed among diﬀerent
issues, rather than a ﬁx e db u d g e td e v o t e dt oﬁght against a particular disease.
Thus, comparisons with other programs have to be made.
22The discipline of health economics has adopted a standard solution to
address these comparisons and to solve the hypothetical trade-oﬀ between
costs and beneﬁts of health care programs. That solution obtains the ratios
between the cost and the outcomes of each program, and selects the one
that shows the lowest cost per unit of outcome. Under the same spirit, we
could consider the cost-opportunity ratios. If the program that oﬀers the
highest potential opportunities is not the less expensive one, then we would
look at the cost-opportunity ratios and would select the one with the lowest
cost-opportunity ratio.
In this paper, we addressed opportunities by means of a metric of oppor-
tunity. Now, opportunities can also be interpreted in terms of capability sets
(Sen, 1985; Herrero and Pinto, 2003). In a health care context, the capabil-
ity set of a certain person is to be understood as the set of health proﬁles
achievable by this person. It is not her health outcome, but rather, the set of
her plausible health outcomes. The opportunities of a person increase when
her capability set becomes higher. This is precisely what would happen for
an impaired newborn whose impairment is detected by means of a newborn
screening program. The opportunity analysis presented here could have been
easily adapted and framed in terms of capability sets.
To conclude, we have applied our model to the current debate on the
implementation of newborn hearing screening programs in some states of
the United States and in some European countries (e.g., National Institutes
of Health Consensus Development Conference Statement, 1993; European
Consensus Project on Neonatal Hearing Screening, 1999; Joint Committee
on Infant Hearing, 2000; Keren et al., 2002). We show that, according to an
opportunity analysis, universal programs are preferred to selective programs,
in which only newborns with risk factor are screened. This conclusion agrees
with the recent pediatric recommendations that have been published (e.g.,
J o i n tC o m m i t t e eo nI n f a n tH e a r i n g ,2 0 0 0 ) .
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